Khodorkovsky & Lebedev Communications Center

MIKHAIL KHODORKOVSKY

Mikhail Khodorkovsky was born in Moscow on June 26, 1963 and was the only child of an ordinary family in Moscow. He is married and has four children. His parents Boris and Marina, now 76 and 75 respectively, earned modest salaries working as chemical engineers at the Caliber Industrial tool plant. When he completed high school he was recognized as the second-best student in mathematics within the entire Soviet Union. Khodorkovsky went on to study at Moscow's Mendeleev Institute of Chemical Technologies and the Plekhanov Institute of Economy – Russia's top economic management school.

In 1987 at the age of 24, Khodorkovsky founded the Youth Centre for Scientific and Technical Development to conduct market research for large manufacturers and introduce them to new technologies.

In 1989, Khodorkovsky together with his business partners founded one of the first commercial banks in Russia – which became known as Bank Menatep. They subsequently established a diversified holding company called Group Menatep. By 1998, Group Menatep had acquired a controlling interest in Yukos.

PLATON LEBEDEV

Platon Lebedev was born on November 29, 1956 and is married with four children. Lebedev graduated in 1981 from the Plekhanov Institute of Economy having studied Industrial Economics. Along with Khodorkovsky, Lebedev was one of the founders of Bank Menatep, acting as President of the bank between 1991 and 1995. The Group had $20 billion of assets, primarily in oil and gas, mineral fertilizers, telecommunications and information technologies, as well as banking and financial services.

Lebedev became Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee of Yukos in 1996 and served as President of Yukos Refining and Marketing from 1997 to 1999. He also led efforts to introduce Yukos stock on international capital markets. Prior to his arrest in July of 2003, he was director of Group Menatep.

YUKOS

Yukos was one of the largest private oil companies in the world, producing 20% of Russia’s oil, the equivalent of 2% of the entire world production. Khodorkovsky and his business partners acquired a majority interest in Yukos for $350 million as part of the 1995-1996 privatization process, inheriting an inefficient Soviet-style energy producer with $3 billion in debt.

Under Khodorkovsky’s leadership, Yukos turned into one of the most successful businesses in Russia. He introduced innovative technology and management methods, hired the best talent, and instituted the best practices known in the oil industry.

With Khodorkovsky at the helm, Yukos increased its profits, leading to a 10-fold rise in market capitalization, and set high standards for Western-style corporate governance and transparency in Russia. By 2002, Yukos had reached a market capitalization of $23 billion.

FALLING FOUL OF THE KREMLIN

By the time of his arrest in October 2003, Khodorkovsky had become a renowned economic reform leader, establishing philanthropic alliances with the Carnegie Endowment, the Library of Congress, George Soros and Oxford University. When George Soros ended his Open Society Institute’s Russian program, Khodorkovsky created “Open Russia” – the country’s largest private philanthropic program, supporting a range of civil society and democracy-building programs with a budget of over $20 million in 2003. Open Russia was later shut down by the Russian government in 2005. He also established a National School of Public Policy to educate students about democracy and the principles of a democratic system. Today, Khodorkovsky’s parents continue their son’s philanthropy by running an orphanage – the Podmoskovny Lyceum – founded by the family in 1994. Strong political pressure is however being exerted to close the orphanage.

Through his philanthropic work, efforts to reform business practices, and advocacy of free enterprise over state monopolies, Khodorkovsky believed that Russia could become a socially progressive, market-oriented democracy that respected human rights and the rule of law. By 2002 and 2003, Khodorkovsky became increasingly vocal on the need to end corruption and create a more robust civil society, and he became increasingly engaged in politics and public policy development.

However, Khodorkovsky’s vision clashed with the Kremlin’s desire to consolidate power, restrict the development of a civil society and strengthen the state-owned enterprises Gazprom and Rosneft. By 2003, relations between Yukos and the Kremlin had deteriorated, with Khodorkovsky publicly challenging Kremlin officials over corruption and increased state interference in private business. Khodorkovsky had become a public irritant and powerful political opponent to Kremlin.

Since his imprisonment, Khodorkovsky has written several articles and given interviews to major media outlets worldwide raising his concerns about the future of democracy in Russia and the economic prosperity of his country [read his articles and interviews].

ARREST AND PROSECUTION OF KHODORKOVSKY AND LEBEDEV

On July 2, 2003, as a warning to Khodorkovsky, Lebedev was arrested – straight out of a hospital where he was receiving medical treatment. Four months later, on October 25, 2003, Khodorkovsky was arrested at gunpoint at an airport in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk by a team of 15 federal agents who stormed a Yukos chartered plane on a refueling stop.

The allegations of criminal activity made against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev included fraud, embezzlement and tax evasion. The trial proceedings began on June 16, 2004, and continued for almost a year, concluding on May 31, 2005. The Meshchansky Court found Khodorkovsky and Lebedev guilty of almost every charge and sentenced them to nine years in prison.

The verdict was based primarily on evidence presented by the prosecution, as a large amount of the defense's evidence was thrown out by the court. Throughout the trial the prosecution experienced far greater success petitioning the court than the defense. On the day of the court's verdict, the Prosecutor General's Office announced it would file new charges of money laundering against the defendants [read a summary of the trial].

In September 2005, the hearing of Khodorkovsky’s appeal of his verdict was rushed through at an impossible speed: the judges took only one hour to reach a decision in a case that lasted a year and consisted of 450 legal volumes. The appeal was for the most part rejected, although the sentence was reduced from nine to eight years. "Not only am I not guilty, but also a crime was never committed," Khodorkovsky said in response. "My guilt has been recognized not by a court, but by a clutch of bureaucrats."

The purpose of the rushed appeal process was to deprive Khodorkovsky of his right to stand for election in the Duma by ensuring his conviction was confirmed before a certain date under the election timetable – which turned out to be the day after the appeal judgment. The authorities were eliminating any chance of Khodorkovsky being elected to the Duma and thus having a political platform – again denying him his right to engagement in political processes and peaceful expression of his political beliefs.

Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were transferred to separate penal colonies thousands of kilometers away in Siberia. After a series of unsuccessful appeals in Russia, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev appealed to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg claiming that the charges against them were politically motivated and their human rights were violated in the course of the criminal investigation and the trial.

DISMANTLING OF YUKOS

Beginning in early 2004, Yukos was hit with a succession of tax bills, the total burden amounting to a staggering $42.2 billion in back taxes for 2000-2004. The tax charges exceeded the company's total revenue for the same time period. As noted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), the allegedly “abusive practices” used by Yukos to minimize taxes were also used by other oil and resource companies operating in Russia. Those companies have not been subject to a similar tax assessment, or its forced execution, and their leading executives have not been criminally prosecuted.

The tax authorities previously had no substantial issue with Yukos, which paid its taxes diligently and in full. In fact, Yukos was the largest private taxpayer in Russia. The absurd total tax arrears levied against Yukos exclude any rationality, unless understood as the sum of a series of incremental charges designed to increase financial pressures on the company until it reached a breaking point. Throughout the proceedings against Yukos, the tax authorities refused to consider any offer to settle the alleged tax obligations. Over fifty settlement offers were proposed by the embattled company. However, as Yukos made these offers, billions more dollars were incrementally added to the tally of alleged tax obligations. The authorities refused to provide any reasons for their failure to respond to the settlement offers. Clearly, the campaign against Yukos sought not to recoup unpaid taxes but rather to destroy the company and expropriate its assets worth over $30 billion, beginning with the Yuganskneftegaz auction.

On December 19, 2004, Yukos’s main production unit, Yuganskneftegaz, was auctioned off by the Russian government to pay for the alleged tax arrears. The sale of Yuganskneftegaz via a front company called Baikal Finance Group marked a climax in the dispute between Yukos and the Russian government. It shook investor confidence in Russia and served as a vivid illustration of the state of rule of law and the security of private property. The unlawful expropriation of Yuganskneftegaz was denounced by Andrei Illarionov, the top Kremlin economic advisor, who called the auction the "scam of the year." In 2005, after six years in the presidential administration, Illarionov resigned to protest the Kremlin’s economic policies, stating there was “no free economic space remaining anywhere in Russia” and that Russia was “no longer politically free.”

Soon after the auction of Yuganskneftegaz, Yukos was forced into bankruptcy proceedings. Although the remaining assets of Yukos were valued at approximately $33 billion, which would have been sufficient to cover the $26.6 billion in what were then court-approved creditors’ claims, the state’s bankruptcy receiver declared the value of the remaining assets to be $22 billion. As with the forced sale in 2004 of Yuganskneftegaz, the state undervalued Yukos assets to facilitate their low-cost acquisition by state-owned enterprises, and to destroy Yukos forever. In 2007, Yukos was liquidated and de-registered from the official list of companies in Russia.

Rosneft, which was a decrepit and non-competitive state-owned oil company, won the lion’s share of Yukos assets auctioned at a fraction of their value as part of the Yukos bankruptcy proceedings. As a result, Rosneft became the largest Russian oil company, and has had a fierce interest in defeating any legal challenges to the dismemberment of Yukos or the imprisonment of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev.

Yukos management appealed to the ECHR claiming the arbitrary and unfair application of tax laws by the Russian government in the Yukos case violated the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECHR ruled in February 2009 that a claim against the Russian government filed by the liquidated oil firm Yukos was partially acceptable. The court accepted that tax claims against Yukos were filed to destroy the company and sell off its assets, largely agreeing with Yukos’s arguments, recognizing its complaint as acceptable in relation to the enforcement of tax claims, including the sale of Yuganskneftegaz, the main Yukos production unit, for debt prepayment and also in relation to doubled tax penalties. Yukos filed a claim for more than $42 billion in damages, giving this case the largest potential financial implications of any case in ECHR history.

In 2007, the Netherlands became the first country in Europe that refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Yukos bankruptcy. The Dutch court said receiver Eduard Rebgun, who had replaced the management of Dutch-based Yukos Finance BV and put all assets, worth about $2 billion, up for sale, had no right to do so, and all his actions were ordered to be reversed. The court in Amsterdam ruled that the Yukos bankruptcy contradicted Dutch legislation and declared the change of management at Yukos Finance BV unlawful.

In April of 2009, the Amsterdam Court of Appeals also decided to recognize and enforce an arbitration decision awarding roughly $400 million to Luxembourg-based Yukos Capital S.a.r.l. in its suit against Rosneft. The award had been made by a Russian arbitration tribunal, but later had been annulled by a Russian court. Nevertheless, the Dutch court found the arbitral award valid and enforceable and the previous decisions by the Russian courts not credible. Now Yukos Capital S.a.r.l. can seize any assets of Rosneft it might find in the Netherlands.

YUKOS SHAREHOLDER SUITS

The dismantling of Yukos by the Russian government violated the Energy Charter Treaty and numerous bilateral investment treaties.

In October 2005 a UK company, RosInvestCo, filed an arbitration case in Sweden under the UK-Russia Bilateral Investment Treaty, arguing that it lost some $75 Million due to the Russian authorities’ unlawful expropriation of Yukos. The company won a jurisdictional ruling in October 2007 and the case is now at arbitration on its merits, despite efforts by the Russian government to challenge the arbitral proceedings through Swedish courts.

Spanish investors in July 2006 also sought compensation from the Russian government for the forced bankruptcy of Yukos. The former Yukos investors are seeking damages of up to $100 billion, claiming that the Russian government violated the Russia-Spain Bilateral Investment Treaty (Agreement for Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments). In April 2009, the Spanish investors won a groundbreaking ruling in the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, opening Russia to potentially dozens of lawsuits from investors over the destruction of Yukos. The Stockholm Court ruled that the case was admissible and is currently pending on the merits.

In 2008, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague considered a claim by GML – formerly Group Menatep – for $50 billion in compensation from the Russian Federation due to the disintegration of Yukos. GML’s Energy Charter Treaty-based claim is the world's largest investment lawsuit to date. Yukos shareholders accuse the Russian Federation of unlawfully expropriating their investments by issuing the company with a series of impossibly huge tax demands, forcing the sale of its production subsidiaries to state-owned companies at a fraction of their value. In December 2009, former Yukos majority shareholders won a crucial ruling that allows them to pursue a claim for up to $100 billion in damages from the Russian government for the unlawful takeover of Yukos. An international arbitral tribunal in The Hague ruled that Russia is in fact bound by its signature of the Energy Charter Treaty, despite the Russian Parliament's subsequent failure to ratify. The decision clears the way for an independent review of the dispute over the takeover of Yukos.

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF KHODORKOVSKY AND LEBEDEV

Khodorkovsky and Lebedev have brought six cases in total before the ECHR, detailing the numerous violations of human rights and due process that they have endured.

In October of 2007, the ECHR found that Lebedev's arrest in 2003 and subsequent pre-trial detention violated international human rights laws, and he was awarded damages. The Court found that Lebedev had been detained illegally and denied access to counsel, that hearings were conducted on the case without Lebedev’s attorneys present, that proceedings were unlawfully delayed, and that the appeal process was obstructed.

In May 2009, the ECHR issued its Admissibility Decision on Khodorkovsky's first application to the Strasbourg court on the political motivation behind his arrest and pre-trial detention. The Court decided that Khodorkovsky's allegations of the following breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights were all admissible:

• Article 3: Inhuman and degrading treatment
• Article 5: Unlawful arrest and subsequent detention
• Article 18: His arrest, detention and prosecution were politically motivated

The ECHR rejected the arguments of the Russian Federation that had sought to have the application ruled inadmissible, and instead ruled that Khodorkovsky's argument that there had been fundamental violations of his human rights raised "serious issues of fact and law" which now must be considered for a final judgment. The court is expected to consider Khodorkovsky’s complaint on the merits in the autumn of 2009 [see ECHR decision].

Four of the petitions by both men are still pending, and include a request to the ECHR to rule on the fairness of Khodorkovsky's and Lebedev's first trial, as well as human rights violations during their incarceration and during the course of the investigation of the new criminal allegations [see ECHR decision].

Compounding the infringement of the defendants' rights, in November 2009, Khodorkovsky and Lebedev had their harsh conditions of detention extended to February 17th, 2010. The court granted a petition from the prosecution in favor of this extension, based primarily on the reiteration of arguments made when the detention issue was reviewed in August 2009.

Also in November 2009, one of the prosecution's witnesses revealed that a secret parallel investigation of a new case against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev is underway. Nadezhda Sheck, a former employee of the International Financial Alliance MENATEP, was called two days before her scheduled testimony in court and told by investigators that she was being questioned for one of multiple ongoing investigations. The defense
team asserted that the revelation was a clear example of how the prosecution uses illegal tactics and places undue pressure on witnesses before they give their testimony in court, and exposed how the judge openly aids and abets the prosecution in such illegal activities.

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES OF YUKOS EMPLOYEES

The Yukos affair has resulted in numerous human rights abuses against former Yukos executives and employees. The abuses have been so grave that they have raised concerns internationally over the obvious political motivations behind the Yukos affair.

A former lawyer and Vice President of Yukos, Vasily Alexanyan, was unlawfully imprisoned in pre-trial detention for two years, without conviction. He was denied medication and treatment despite being HIV-positive and cancer-stricken. Alexanyan refused to make false statements to incriminate Khodorkovsky in exchange for health care. The ECHR made three urgent appeals to Russia for Alexanyan’s release and for the dispensation of medical treatment. These appeals were ignored by Russian officials. Following a hunger strike by Khodorkovsky, Aleksanyan was transferred from a pre-trial prison to a hospital in February 2009.

Svetlana Bakhmina, a Yukos lawyer who went on hunger strike over her cruel treatment after being detained in December 2004, was sentenced to seven years in prison on dubious fraud and tax evasion charges. She was widely considered to be held as a hostage to compel her former Yukos chief to return to Russia from exile in London. Her exceedingly harsh prison term was imposed despite provisions in Russian law that would have permitted her to raise her two minor children and serve her prison time later. Her children were seven and three years old respectively at the time of her detention. Bakhmina’s treatment by the authorities was broadly criticized worldwide. By the time she gave birth in November 2008 to a baby girl while incarcerated, over one hundred thousand signatures had been collected as part of an internet campaign launched to support Bakhmina’s release. Bakhmina was finally released on parole in April 2009, after almost three and a half years of detention.

Many other Yukos employees were condemned to lengthy prison sentences based on trumped up and fabricated charges or continue to face persecution by the Russian government. There are over one hundred families that fled Russia since 2003 for fear of persecution. Several Yukos executives who fled to other countries were sought after by the Russian authorities, but extradition requests have been consistently refused by foreign authorities stating they do not believe Russia will respect human rights or due process in such politically-charged cases.

The Bow Street Magistrates’ Court in the UK concluded in March 2005 that Khodorkovsky was prosecuted for political reasons, and that if extradited, persons related to Yukos would suffer from politically motivated prosecution. The judge refused to extradite Dmitry Maruev and Natalya Chernysheva, and in fact discharged the defendants. In the following years, UK courts refused to extradite several other former associates of Khodorkovsky, having found that the charges against them were politically motivated.

In July 2007, a Czech court refused to extradite to Russia Elena Vybornova, who was wanted for testimony related to the new charges brought against Khodorkovsky that year. Despite an international warrant issued by the Russian procuracy, the Czech court decided to protect Vybornova from the likelihood of unfair treatment under Russian justice.

In August 2007, the senior prosecutor in the Prosecutor General’s Office of Lithuania refused to extradite Mikhail Brudno, a business partner of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, ruling that the Yukos affair was politically motivated, and that Russia had not provided a fair trial to anyone associated with Khodorkovsky.

In August 2007, the Swiss Federal Tribunal forbade Swiss authorities from cooperating with Russian prosecutors in connection with requests for legal assistance related to the allegations against Khodorkovsky. The Tribunal – which is Switzerland’s highest court – noted that such assistance must be refused when a case is "a subterfuge to pursue a person for his political opinion". This was the first time, outside of extradition cases, that Swiss courts denied assistance to foreign authorities because a case was political in nature.

In April 2008, a Cyprus court refused to extradite former senior Yukos executive Vladislav Kartashov to Russia, ruling that the case is politically motivated. The court stated "there is a real risk that his right to a fair trial will be flagrantly violated" and that "the charges faced by the respondent in Russia are tainted with political motives". This followed the refusal in March 2008 of Cyprus prosecutors to comply with a Russian request for international legal assistance on the Yukos case.

In August 2009, Spanish authorities refused to extradite Antonio Valdez Garcia, whom the Russian Prosecutor General's Office had sought in connection with the case against former Yukos officials. Valdez Garcia, a Russian-born Spanish national, is the former head of Fargoil, a former Yukos oil trading subsidiary that plays a central role in the second trial against Khodorkovsky. At the request of the Russian General Prosecutor's office, Valdez Garcia returned to Russia in July of 2005. He was charged criminally shortly thereafter. After he was almost killed in the custody of the enforcement agencies, Valdez Garcia managed to escape Russia. In 2009, he filed a criminal complaint in Russia against the Prosecutor's office, describing threats, blackmail and torture inflicted upon him to force him to provide false testimony against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev. The Prosecutor's office denied the allegations.

THE NEW TRIAL

The state brought new charges against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev on February 5, 2007.

The sloppily-drafted indictment alleges embezzlement of a staggering 350 million metric tons of oil worth some $25.4 billion; embezzlement of shares held by a Yukos subsidiary; and money laundering resulting from the sale of the allegedly embezzled oil. Khodorkovsky and Lebedev are facing up to 15 years in prison. The amount of oil they are accused of stealing is absurd, amounting to the entire production of Yukos and its subsidiaries over a six-year period (or the equivalent of 80% of Russia's entire annual oil production). The charges contradict those of the first trial and have no legal or factual support.

Responding to the charges of embezzlement, Khodorkovsky called on the prosecutors to present any evidence that proved 350 million metric tons of oil had disappeared, highlighting the fact that no missing oil was either reported or established. In fact, the amount of oil the prosecution claim had disappeared is enough to fill a railroad train that would encircle the earth three times.

As it has been demonstrated so far, the prosecutors do not understand basic principles of business management of a company such as Yukos. Ordinary, widespread business practices have simply been labeled by prosecutors as “criminal”, demonstrating a willful disregard for the most fundamental aspects of the oil and gas industry and the operation of either a major Russian or an international vertically integrated oil and gas company. The prosecutors and the investigators have a clear vested interest in a predetermined outcome for the trial and will exert enormous pressure on the judge to achieve that outcome. During a series of preliminary hearings early in 2009, Chief Judge Viktor Danilkin of Moscow's Khamovnichesky Court denied all motions filed by the defense team regarding the absurdity of the charges. The trial started on March 31, 2009 [see courtroom updates].

Guilty verdicts at the end of the trial would send a damaging message to foreign investors, governments and international tribunals that the country is not ready to change. This would seriously undermine trust in Russia’s legal and political institutions for years to come. The trial is therefore being watched as the key test of President Dmitry Medvedev’s pledge to tackle his country’s “legal nihilism” that drags down the Russian economy, jeopardizes foreign investment and strains diplomatic relations [read about the new charges].

POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE YUKOS AFFAIR

There were two central motives behind the Kremlin’s campaign against Khodorkovsky: eliminating Khodorkovsky as a political opponent, and eliminating Yukos as a way to re-nationalize the company’s assets and increase the Kremlin’s power. In the Kremlin’s pursuit of these objectives, Khodorkovsky and Yukos were inextricably intertwined.

The new charges further advanced these objectives, by ensuring that Khodorkovsky and Lebedev were not released on parole in October 2007 (when they were eligible to be freed under current Russian law and practice), that Khodorkovsky has no opportunity to play an active role in shaping Russia’s political future, and by legitimizing the past state campaign to dismantle Yukos and expropriate assets worth over $30 billion.

The evidence behind the political motivations of Khodorkovsky’s wrongful imprisonment was bolstered in a 2009 Financial Times interview with former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov. For the first time, Kasyanov disclosed details of closed-door conversations he had with then-President Vladimir Putin, in which the President revealed political motives for the state’s proceedings against Khodorkovsky. According to Kasyanov, in a private meeting in the Kremlin in July 2003, President Putin told him that Khodorkovsky had “crossed a line” by supporting certain political parties without his permission. This disclosure from a former Prime Minister of Russia is damning evidence of the administration’s abuse of the Russian legal system for political ends.

HOW IS THE YUKOS AFFAIR VIEWED IN RUSSIA?

Numerous prominent and respected Russians support Khodorkovsky and Lebedev, including opposition leader and former chess champion Garry Kasparov, Soviet dissidents and Russian activists Lev Ponomarev and Liudmila Alekseeva, and, before she was murdered, the investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya.

Beginning with the resignation of Vladimir Putin’s chief of staff, Alexander Voloshin, over Khodorkovsky’s arrest, a coalition of parliamentarians who in 2003 vouched for Khodorkovsky as guarantors should he be released on bail during the pre-trial period, and then the resignation of top Kremlin economic adviser Andrei Illarionov, the Yukos affair has led many influential and respected Russians to conclude that their country is headed down the wrong path. Igor Yurgens, senior adviser to President Medvedev, said in a May 2009 newspaper interview: "This is a case of selective jurisprudence and of disproportionate brutality that is counterproductive for the state itself”.

Thousands have protested against the incarceration of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev. Protesters are usually met with a stiff and disproportionate police response, with leaders arrested and supporters dispersed. A 2009 Levada-Center opinion poll showed that 60% of Russians believe the fate of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev is being decided by the Kremlin and not the courts. Of the 60%, three-quarters condemned the Kremlin's involvement. The independent opinion poll conducted in 46 Russian regions also showed that 57% of respondents believed Khodorkovsky would bring more good to Russia if he was released from jail. The poll showed that Russians feel better informed of the developments in the Khodorkovsky trial; however over 56% of respondents said they still don’t understand the charges.

It is also true that many in Russia saw a form of vindication in Khodorkovsky’s arrest and sentencing, as if his suffering could atone for the loss felt at the end of the Soviet Union or the anger over the oligarchs who acquired enormous wealth and fled Russia. But there are also those who were imprisoned for criticizing the Kremlin’s regime, those who denounced the end of independent media and viable opposition parties in Russia and those who believe Russia must first end rampant corruption in government and business before it can prosper. These are the people who write to Khodorkovsky in prison and tell him not to give up, who praise him for maintaining his dignity, and urge him to continue expressing his thoughts [Read more comments from inside Russia].

HOW IS THE YUKOS AFFAIR VIEWED BY THE REST OF THE WORLD?

Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev have generated an outpouring of support from around the world:

• Business leaders and investors question the merit of the attack on Russia's most successful and transparent company.
• Political leaders and international organizations note the political nature of the trial and express uncertainty about the state of Russia's democracy and rule of law.
• Human rights advocates decry the abject trampling of Khodorkovsky's and Lebedev's legal rights and the torture and mistreatment of their former Yukos colleagues.

[Read more comments from around the world]

Europe

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

The most comprehensive international study of the original Khodorkovsky-Lebedev proceedings is the November 2004 report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, on “The circumstances surrounding the arrest and prosecution of leading Yukos executives”. The report concluded that “the circumstances of the arrest and prosecution of leading Yukos executives suggest that the interest of the State’s action in these cases goes beyond the mere pursuit of criminal justice, to include such elements as to weaken an outspoken political opponent, to intimidate other wealthy individuals and to regain control of strategic economic assets.”

In June 2009, a report of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe examined “politically-motivated abuses of the criminal justice system in Council of Europe member states”, with a heavy emphasis on Russia and the Khodorkovsky case in particular. Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, a former German minister of justice who as rapporteur led the research and writing for this report, highlighted the Yukos affair as “emblematic” of the risks faced by investors who come up against state authorities. The report describes the new charges against Khodorkovsky as “bizarre” and “contradictory,” and asserts that Russian authorities are waging an “unrelenting campaign” against Yukos and its executives. The report also describes many of the inconsistencies in the prosecutors’ arguments as “perplexing”.

On September 30th 2009, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed Resolution 1685 (2009), based on the June 2009 PACE report regarding politically-motivated abuses of the criminal justice system in Council of Europe member states. The resolution cites "a number of high-profile cases, such as the second trial of M. Khodorkovsky and P. Lebedev...[that] give rise to concerns that the fight against ‘legal
nihilism' launched by President [Medvedev] is still far from won." The resolution was passed with 74 votes in favor, none opposed and four abstentions.

The European Parliament

In 2008, Mr Hans-Gert Pöttering, former President of the European Parliament, expressed his concern over the second trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky:

“I would also like to take this opportunity to strongly appeal to the authorities of the Russian Federation, particularly in this time when the negotiations on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement have been resumed with the European Union, to take seriously their commitment to respect the law in their country. The fate of political prisoners is indeed of highest importance for the European Union”.

In April 2009, the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee adopted its 2008 Annual Report on Human Rights in the World. The Committee strongly criticized the Russian government and expressed concern about the mistreatment of Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and Vasily Alexanyan; and the lack of an independent judiciary in Russia. In the report, the Committee said it: “regrets that the European Union has not succeeded in bringing about any change of policy in Russia, particularly with regard to impunity and the independence of the judiciary, the treatment of human rights defenders and political prisoners including Mikhail Khodorkovsky” and “expresses further concern, in line with the Amnesty International Report of 2008, as to the ongoing failure of the Office of the Prosecutor to respect the right of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his associate Platon Lebedev to a fair trial in accordance with international standards, and deeply regrets the treatment of former Yukos vice-president Vasily Aleksanian, whose refusal to provide false testimony against Mikhail Khodorkovsky led the Russian authorities to allow his medical condition to deteriorate to a terminal state”

On November 12th 2009, the European Parliament adopted a resolution ahead of the EU-Russia Summit held in Stockholm on November 18th, expressing concern over developments in Russia that undermine efforts towards closer EU-Russia relations. The resolution urged the EU Council and Commission to pay "utmost attention to the ongoing second trial of former Yukos Oil chief Mikhail Khodorkovsky, which is already replete with severe due process violations," and called upon Russian authorities "to combat arbitrariness, to respect the rule of law and not to use the judiciary as a political tool." In a letter handed to President Medvedev during the Stockholm summit, more than 100 Members of the European Parliament expressed their concerns about the shortcomings of the rule of law and abuses of human rights in Russia.

European Commission

In November 2006, at the Russia-EU summit held in Helsinki, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso raised the cases of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Anna Politkovskaya with then-President Putin.

Germany

German Chancellor & German Parliament

On March 8, 2008, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that Germany “would welcome” the release of Khodorkovsky from prison. Chancellor Merkel again expressed concerns about Khodorkovsky during President Medvedev’s visit to Berlin on June 5, 2008.

In July 2009, the German Bundestag approved a resolution calling for constitutional reform in Russia. The cross-party resolution cites several trials of concern, including that of Khodorkovsky. The resolution notes that there is fear that Khodorkovsky's trial was "a means to pursue political goals" and that it represents a test case for President Medvedev's commitment to the credibility of Russian justice. Commenting on the trial in July 2009, MP Markus Meckel, SPD Foreign Affairs Spokesman, said: “The second trial currently underway is all the more a test case to see whether the Russian justice system will make the grade. There are many signs to indicate that the new trial is also politically motivated. The charges seem absurd alone from the supposed amount of embezzled crude oil, which was enough that if it were filled into train cars and lined up, the line would circle the earth three times."

German Industry Association

On March 4, 2008, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung quoted Klaus Mangold, chair of the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations of the German Industry Association, who appealed to President Medvedev to ease Khodorkovsky’s conditions of incarceration, stating “this would be a visible and significant sign for the handling of human rights.”

Italy

Italian Parliament

On April 28, 2009, the International Christian Democrat Party voted unanimously in favor of a motion asking President Medvedev to assure a just and fair trial for Khodorkovsky. President Pier Ferdinando Casini addressed Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Foreign Affairs Minister Franco Frattini on the Khodorkovsky case in an open letter.

On 24th September, the Italian parliament voted in favour of a motion urging the Italian Government "to activate all diplomatic channels, together with other European partners, to guarantee the respect for human rights and the right of defence for Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev and for all Russian citizens". The motion, presented by Pier Ferdinando Casini, leader of the Christian Democrat Party (UDC), receives overwhelming support: out of 478 MPs attending the plenary session, 430 vote in favour. During the debate, Alfredo Mantica, Undersecretary of State for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressed support for the motion on behalf of the Government and called for the unanimous adoption by all political groups.

Spain

Spanish Congress of Deputies

On March 1, 2005, the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Spanish Congress of Deputies passed a motion supporting the release of Mikhail Khodorkovsky (file number 161/1408), published in the "BOCG. Congreso de los Diputados" Series D, Volume 325 1st February 2006, to call upon Russian authorities to respect Resolutions 1418 (2005) and 1692 (2005) of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe in relation to Khodorkovsky and other YUKOS executives, in reference to infringements of the rule of law; and to request the immediate transfer of Khodorkosvky to a detention center with conditions of incarceration to which he is legally entitled as is any prisoner, and which is in proximity to his immediate family.

France

Hervé Mariton, Deputy of the French National Assembly

Hervé Mariton, Deputy of the French National Assembly and Head of the France-Russia parliament group, observed the current trial in April 2009; in an interview with Journal du Dimanche, Mariton said there was a feeling of “quiet oppression” in the courtroom. He also concluded that Khodorkovsky has “no possibility to defend himself correctly” and that the way he is being treated is “arbitrary and inhuman”. Mariton said: “this trial seems Kafkaian, Khodorkovsky never had a chance to defend himself in a fair trial; his rights as a human are not respected".”

Leading French Philosopher André Glucksmann

In an article published October 26, 2007 in Le Monde, under the headline “Sakharov and Khodorkovsky: The Same Battle”, French philosopher André Glucksmann, citing Elena Bonner and Anna Politkovskaya, described Khodorkovsky’s ongoing imprisonment as retribution for his expression of political values inconsistent with those of the regime.

UK

UK Parliament

In October 2009, the UK Government indicated that Khodorkovsky's case would be raised when British Foreign Secretary David Miliband visited Moscow in November. As part of a debate in the House of Commons on UK relations with Russia, Chris Bryant, British Minister for Europe, assured Parliament that the Foreign Secretary would raise the issue in meetings with the Russian Government saying "we have raised the
issue of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and we will continue to raise the issue with Russia". Liberal Democrat Shadow Foreign Secretary Ed Davey MP stated that the trial was "quite symbolic of how Russia approaches law and order, democracy and human rights", saying:"If Russia changed its position on the case, it would send a signal to the EU and the west about reform. A reforming Russia is a Russia that we can do business with." The Foreign Secretary's visit was the first by a British Foreign Secretary to Russia since 2004.

US

US Congress

In November 2005, then-Senator Barack Obama with then-Senator Joe Biden and Senator John McCain co-sponsored Senate Resolution 322, stating that “the trial, sentencing, and imprisonment of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev have raised troubling questions about the impartiality and integrity of the judicial system in Russia.”

In June 2009, key members of the US House and Senate introduced two resolutions (588 and 189) condemning the current trial of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev. US Reps. James McGovern (D-MA), chairman of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission, and Robert Wexler (D-FL.), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, introduced a resolution in the US House of Representatives stating that the trial constitutes a politically-motivated case of selective arrest and prosecution that serves as a test of the rule of law and independence of Russia’s judicial system.

US State Department

On February 5, 2007, when the new allegations against Khodorkovsky and Lebedev emerged, the US State Department issued the following comment:

“As we have commented in connection with the original trial, the continued prosecution of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the dismantlement of Yukos raise serious questions about the rule of law in Russia. Khodorkovsky and his associate, Platon Lebedev, would have been eligible to apply for parole this year, having served half of their terms. These new charges would likely preclude their early release. Many of the actions in the case against Khodorkovsky and Yukos have raised serious concerns about the independence of courts, sanctity of contracts and property rights, and the lack of a predictable tax regime. The conduct of Russian authorities in the Khodorkovsky Yukos affair has eroded Russia’s reputation and confidence in Russian legal and judicial institutions. Such actions as this and other cases raise questions about Russia’s commitment to the responsibilities which all democratic, free market economies countries embrace.”

HOW IS THE ‘YUKOS AFFAIR’ VIEWED BY NGOS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS?

Leading Human Rights Groups

In April 2009, leaders of eight Western human rights groups released an open letter to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev expressing their concern for the deterioration of respect for rule of law and human rights in Russia in connection with the Khodorkovsky-Lebedev trial. Signatories of the letter included Amnesty International, Freedom House, Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch, the International League for Human Rights, the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, and the Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice.

Amnesty International

In Amnesty International's 2009 Human Rights Report the Khodorkovsky case is raised as evidence of Russia's "lack of respect for the rule of law". Commenting on Khodorkovsky's trial, the report states that in 2008, he was denied parole, unlawfully punished and placed in a detention center with constrained access to his legal counsel and family. In 2005 after the first trial, Amnesty International said it believed there was a “significant political context to the arrest and prosecution” of Khodorkovsky and Lebedev and other Yukos staff.

Club of Madrid members

In November 2005, Vaclav Havel wrote a letter to then-President Putin, co-signed by Mary Robinson and other former world leaders, stating: “[The] cases of Mikhail Trepashkin, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Platon Lebedev and Svetlana Bakhmina are instances of attempts by the government to silence its critics and eliminate political opponents from political life and social dialogue in Russia. Time and again politically-motivated prosecutions are made to appear as prosecution of criminal offences.” Havel was the inaugural Amnesty International Ambassador of Conscience in 2003, and Robinson followed as Ambassador of Conscience in 2004.

Freedom House

The 2004 “Freedom in the World” report by Freedom House observed that the Khodorkovsky case “centered on politics rather than alleged corruption. Khodorkovsky had actively supported pro-market opposition liberal parties. Indeed, many of the charges against him stemmed from the early period of Russia’s economic transition from communism, when a maze of contradictory laws meant that many people engaged in business were not fully compliant with Russian law…The arrests and investigations in 2003 of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the Yukos energy company, and the Menatep Group reinforced perceptions that the rule of law is subordinated to political considerations and the judiciary is not independent of the president and his inner circle.”

[Read more comments from human rights advocates]

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]

In a November 2006 report, the OECD criticised the Russian state’s intrusions into the country’s energy sector as a “disturbing” phenomenon that “bodes ill for Russia’s growth prospects.” In a 216-page assessment of the Russian economy, the OECD stated that pervasive corruption was a significant barrier to investment. In the report, the OECD traced the rise of the state’s invasiveness in commercial spheres to the forced Yukos auction of 2004. The report listed subsequent acquisitions by state-controlled energy companies to show that the interventionist trend had only intensified.

Media Inquiries
For media enquiries in Russia, please contact media@khodorkovskycenter.com or +7 (495) 773-4466. For all media enquiries outside of Russia, please contact at mbkpress@tetra-strategy.co.uk or +44 (0)20 7823 4608.

Archival Information and Documentation
archives@khodorkovskycenter.com

To Attend the Trial

Khamovnichesky Court
119121, Moscow, 7th Rostovsky per, b.21
(499) 248-68-26 / (499) 248-18-09

Court is in usually session from 10:30am to 6:00pm, Monday to Friday (except Wednesdays). However, please note that these times are subject to change.

For assistance on visiting court to see the trial, please contact the Russian Press Centre:

Email: info@khodorkovsky.ru
Phone: +7 (495) 773-4466